Judicial Discretion in Sentencing: A Justice System that is No Longer Just? by Mallett, Sean J
  533 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING: A JUSTICE SYSTEM 
THAT IS NO LONGER JUST? 
Sean J Mallett* 
One of the fundamental principles of the criminal law is consistency: like offenders must be treated 
alike. However, research has shown that when it comes to sentencing in New Zealand, there is in 
fact substantial regional disparity in the penalty imposed on similarly situated offenders. The 
situation is unacceptable, and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system. This article 
will explore three different mechanisms for guiding judicial discretion in the pursuit of sentencing 
consistency. It will undertake an analysis of mandatory sentences and the "instinctive synthesis" 
approach, both of which will be shown to be unsatisfactory. Instead, the article will argue that the 
establishment of a Sentencing Council with a mandate to draft presumptively binding guidelines is 
the most appropriate way forward for New Zealand. This option finds the correct equilibrium 
between giving a judge sufficient discretion to tailor a sentence that is appropriate in the 
circumstances of the individual case, yet limiting discretion enough to achieve consistency between 
cases.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing … is founded upon two premises that are in perennial conflict: individualized justice and 
consistency. The first holds that courts should impose sentences that are just and appropriate according 
to all of the circumstances of each particular case. The second holds that similarly situated offenders 
should receive similar sentencing outcomes. The result is an ambivalent jurisprudence that challenges 
sentencers as they attempt to meet the conflicting demands of each premise.1 
Sentencing is a notoriously difficult component of the criminal law. It requires a judge to 
balance complex, abstract and often competing considerations with a view to achieving the elusive 
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. 
1  Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg "Pursuing Consistency in an Individualist Sentencing Framework: If 
You Know Where You're Going, How Do You Know When You've Got There?" (2013) 76 Law and 
Contemp Probs 265 at 265.  
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and equally abstract notion of "justice". To this end, judges have traditionally enjoyed considerable 
discretion to tailor an appropriate sentence, subject to the maximum penalties prescribed by 
Parliament. However, this flexibility comes at the cost of another important principle of the criminal 
law: consistency. The more discretion a judge is allowed to exercise, the greater the risk of similarly 
situated offenders being treated differently. How to resolve this tension and find a suitable 
equilibrium is a problem faced by jurisdictions the world over. 
This article will examine the extent of sentencing inconsistency in New Zealand, and investigate 
various approaches to guiding judicial discretion in the imposition of criminal penalties. It will 
begin by analysing the importance of the consistency principle itself, with a particular focus on the 
effect parity has on public confidence in the judiciary. If similar offenders are not treated alike then 
the community begins to view the courts as unfair, which in turn jeopardises the ongoing legitimacy 
of the justice system. Ensuring that there are adequate mechanisms in place to achieve sentencing 
consistency is of fundamental importance to our system of law.  
In New Zealand these mechanisms take two forms: the principles and purposes of sentencing 
found under the Sentencing Act 2002, and guideline judgments issued by the Court of Appeal. On 
analysis these will be shown to be inadequate. Studies have revealed that there is still substantial 
inconsistency in sentencing across geographic locations, particularly in relation to the less serious 
offences which form the bulk of the cases dealt with by the District Courts on a daily basis. The 
purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the Sentencing Act are too broad, and are simply a 
restatement of the common law position. Guideline judgments are more effective, but suffer from 
several systemic and constitutional limitations. Policy adjustments are clearly required, and this 
article will examine three different approaches that the legislature could adopt in order to achieve 
greater consistency in sentencing.  
If the amount of discretion a judge enjoys could be placed on a spectrum, at one end would lie 
mandatory sentences. Mandatory sentences ensure consistency in sentencing by legislatively 
removing discretion entirely. However, because the facts of any given case are unique, this approach 
inevitably comes at the expense of individualised justice. Furthermore, the practical effect of 
mandatory sentences would be simply to shift discretion from the judges into the hands of police 
and prosecutors, as an offender's sentence would effectively be determined by the choice of charge 
laid. This raises issues around transparency and accountability, leading to the conclusion that the 
widespread implementation of mandatory sentences would cause more problems than it could 
potentially solve. 
At the other end of the spectrum lies the "intuitive synthesis" approach, a doctrine that removes 
constraints on judicial discretion entirely, giving the sentencing judge a wide scope to balance the 
innumerable factors that make up an individual case and come to a decision that is holistically 
appropriate in all the circumstances. This approach has been adopted in jurisdictions in the federal 
systems of Australia and Canada, and is underpinned by the belief that there is no objectively "right" 
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sentence. However, it will be argued that the doctrine would be a retrograde step for New Zealand, 
because it both masks, and in many respects normalises, disparity. 
The appropriate way forward for New Zealand is to adopt a mechanism that falls within the 
above two extremes. Discussion will therefore turn to the implementation of a Sentencing Council, a 
body comprised of experts and judges with a mandate to issue presumptively binding sentencing 
guidelines. Such a Council exists on the statute books in New Zealand,2 but has not been established 
in practice. Because the body would be in a position to undertake extensive research and 
consultation, it can in turn provide coherence to sentencing policy as a whole, while also giving the 
Government enhanced control over its Corrections budget. Several constitutional issues have been 
raised about the existence of such a body, but these will be shown to be overstated. The only real 
concern is ensuring that a Council has widespread judicial support, something that is critical to its 
ongoing success. The article will conclude that the establishment of a Sentencing Council is the 
most appropriate mechanism for guiding judicial discretion and ensuring consistency within the 
criminal justice system. 
II IMPORTANCE OF CONSISTENCY IN SENTENCING 
Consistency in sentencing is of fundamental importance to the criminal justice system, and has 
been afforded statutory recognition in New Zealand under s 8(e) of the Sentencing Act 2002. What 
is needed is parity: like offenders must be treated alike, a maxim that has its origins in the works of 
Aristotle.3 If offenders are not treated alike, then the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that the 
resulting disparity "can result in injustice to an accused person and may raise doubts about the even-
handed administration of justice".4 Conversely, dissimilar cases should not be treated in a like 
fashion. Both of these situations would lead to injustice and erode public confidence in the legal 
system.5 
The importance of maintaining this confidence cannot be overstated. Victims and witnesses will 
only cooperate with police and prosecutors if they trust the system and the professionals – including 
judges – with whom they have contact.6 That trust will quickly diminish if the public perceives the 
system to be inconsistent in its outcomes and thus unfair. The legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system hinges on public support, and this needs to be earned. As Professor Julian Roberts notes, a 
  
2  Sentencing Council Act 2007. 
3  See CJ Rowe and Sarah Broadie (eds) Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
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4  R v Morris [1991] 3 NZLR 641 (CA) at 645. 
5  R v Lawson [1982] 2 NZLR 219 (CA) at 223; and Niamh Maguire "Consistency in Sentencing" (2010) 2 
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and Emergency Preparedness Canada, November 2004) at 1. 
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central part of earning legitimacy is to maintain notions of fairness and integrity.7 Sara Benesh 
characterises the need for confidence slightly differently, saying that in order for the rule of law to 
remain operative, "citizens need to trust the institution charged with its keeping".8 Parity in 
sentencing underpins the rule of law, a doctrine which requires both the absence of arbitrary power 
and the need for fixed and predictable laws.9 The existence and imposition of inconsistent sentences 
makes it impossible for the citizenry to foresee the consequences of their actions.  
Although consistency is an important principle in any jurisdiction that gives weight to the rule of 
law, its enforcement needs to be given special emphasis in those countries that maintain high levels 
of incarceration. This includes New Zealand, a nation that has traditionally sat at the more punitive 
end of the sentencing spectrum. As at 30 June 2014, New Zealand had 6,754 people serving a 
sentence of imprisonment, with a further 1,817 inmates on remand,10 representing an incarceration 
rate of approximately 190 per 100,000 of population.11 This is higher than a number of comparable 
jurisdictions, including Australia (170 per 100,000 as at June 2013),12 Canada (113 per 100,000 as 
at August 2014) and the United Kingdom (149 per 100,000 as at August 2014).13 Indeed, the only 
major Western nation with a higher incarceration rate than New Zealand is the United States, which 
tips the scales at an astonishing 707 prisoners per 100,000 of population.14 Any criminal justice 
system that is forced to sentence such high volumes of offenders inherently leaves itself exposed to 
greater levels of inconsistency.  
The need for consistency is required at two levels: individual consistency in the practice of a 
particular judge dealing with like offenders who appear before them; but also consistency between 
judges generally in dealing with like cases within the same jurisdiction.15 The more cases being 
heard in that jurisdiction, the more difficult it is to ensure that the same sentencing practices are 
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5 December 2013). 
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<www.prisonstudies.org>. 
14  International Centre for Prison Studies, above n 13. 
15  Geraldine Mackenzie "Achieving Consistency in Sentencing: Moving to Best Practice?" (2002) 22 UQLJ 74 
at 75 
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being followed. While we can expect a judge to be personally consistent in his or her approach to 
sentencing, the difficulty arises when trying to achieve consistency between adjudicators. Judges are 
endowed with significant discretion to tailor a sentence that is appropriate and does justice in the 
circumstances of the particular case. But what is an appropriate sentence? Opinions will clearly 
differ. Parliament is therefore left with the "significant challenge" of regulating judicial discretion in 
such a way that can balance the need for consistency with the reality that cases are unique and 
require individualised justice.16 
III GUIDING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Once Parliament has prescribed the maximum penalty for an offence, judges in New Zealand do 
not have carte blanche to impose any sanction they see fit. They are, of course, bound by precedent. 
Sentences imposed must conform with those that have come before. However, given the sheer 
number of sentencing decisions handed down on a daily basis, relying on general precedent alone is 
a daunting task. Judicial discretion in this field is therefore guided by two further mechanisms: the 
purposes and principles set out under ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act 2002; and guideline 
judgments issued by the appellate courts. In practice, the former provides little practical assistance, 
and the latter suffers from a number of systemic limitations.  
A Purposes and Principles of Sentencing  
In 1997, the Ministry of Justice issued a discussion paper entitled Sentencing Policy and 
Guidance, part of which looked at the different possible methods for guiding judicial sentencing 
discretion.17 It put forward a number of options ranging from mandatory sentences,18 right through 
to a fully comprehensive sentencing information system that would provide judges with empirical 
sentencing data pertaining to offence subcategories.19 The drafters of the Sentencing Act chose to 
implement a general statement of sentencing purposes and principles, along with a non-exhaustive 
list of aggravating and mitigating factors, all of which can now be found in ss 7, 8 and 9 respectively 
of the Act. This was the loosest possible form of control on sentencing discretion that the Ministry 
could implement.20 The Law Commission described it as a "significant change to [the] traditional 
approach" to sentencing,21 although other commentators have been more reserved in their praise.22 
  
16  Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds) Principled Sentencing: Readings on 
Theory and Policy (3rd ed, Hart Publishing, Portland, 2009) at 229. 
17  Ministry of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance – A Discussion Paper (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 
1997) at [11].  
18  At [11.3]. 
19  At [11.7.1]. 
20  John Ip "Sentencing Guidelines post-Sentencing Act" [2005] NZLJ 397 at 399. 
21  Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform (NZLC R94, 2006) at [30]. 
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John Ip doubts whether the changes have had any significant effect on sentencing discretion at all, 
saying that:23 
Given the level of generality at which the sentencing purposes and principles are expressed, and given 
they can frequently suggest contradictory outcomes, it seems naïve in retrospect to have expected 
anything more. 
This criticism is not unwarranted. Many of the sentencing principles listed in the Sentencing Act 
are self-evident. As Roberts rightly notes, "no judge in New Zealand… needs to be told, for 
example, that the maximum penalty should be imposed only for the most serious cases, although 
that is the direction contained in section 8(c)".24 Nor do the purposes of sentencing offer any 
practical assistance in the application of discretion, as judges "remain free to 'pick and mix' from 
among the list of purposes, according to their pre-existing individual preferences".25 The result is an 
unusual situation whereby the sentencing judge has the discretion to choose which purpose to adopt 
as a means to guide their discretion – a discretion within a discretion.  
Furthermore, the legislature has codified such an extensive number of sentencing rationales that 
they often contradict each other in practice. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, there being an 
inherent difficulty in imposing a sentence that provides for both the interests of the victim26 and the 
offender's rehabilitation and reintegration.27 Professor Geoff Hall claims that "the legislature has 
failed to develop a coherent sentencing policy from the theories of punishment that comprise this 
country's penal philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing".28 The irony is that the Ministry of 
Justice explicitly acknowledged the flaws in implementing a range of equally weighted sentencing 
purposes and the inevitable problems they would cause in the discretionary environment in which 
they have to operate.29 The rationale for implementing them anyway was that "no one sentencing 
goal on its own provides a sufficient basis on which to provide a coherent and comprehensive 
sentencing regime", because which purpose to invoke is dependent on the individual circumstances 
of the offence and the offender.30 This may be true, but it incorrectly assumes that there are only 
  
22  See Julian Roberts "Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: An Analysis of the Sentencing Act 2002" (2003) 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 249. 
23  John Ip "Sentencing Reform" [2007] NZLJ 9 at 10. 
24  Roberts, above n 22, at 257. 
25  At 256. 
26  Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(c). 
27  Section 7(1)(h).  
28  Geoff Hall Sentencing Law and Practice (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [1.3]. 
29  Ministry of Justice, above n 17, at [3.6]. 
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two alternatives to choose from: the implementation of a single rationale of sentencing; or the 
implementation of a range of equally weighted rationales. As Professor Andrew Ashworth notes, 
there is a middle ground whereby the legislature can "declare a primary rationale, and provide that 
in certain types of case one or another rationale might be given priority".31 This is the position in 
Sweden, and was formerly the position in England under the Criminal Justice Act 1991.32 
Without a clearly defined hierarchy of sentencing rationales, the current smorgasbord of 
purposes and principles found under the Sentencing Act are of little practical assistance to 
sentencing judges.  
B Guideline Judgments 
Given the effective failure of the Sentencing Act to guide the application of judicial discretion, 
commentators such as Ip believe that the sentencing guideline judgments (also known as tariff 
judgments) issued by the Court of Appeal are a superior means of ensuring discretion is applied 
consistently in the criminal sentencing context.33 This view is echoed by the Law Commission 
which, despite having some sympathy for the Sentencing Act, conceded that ss 7 and 8 "provide 
little or no assistance in determining the 'tariff' custody threshold or sentence length appropriate for 
the average case of each type coming before the courts".34  
Guideline judgments issued by the appellate courts provide authoritative guidance on how to 
approach sentencing for particular types of offences. These judgments generally set out sentencing 
"bands" of escalating seriousness depending on the number and nature of aggravating factors 
relating to the offending. The court gives examples of the types of aggravating features that fall 
within each band, and sets a range of sentencing starting points for each.35 Subsequent judges can 
then slot the case before them into one of the bands of the appropriate guideline judgment to 
determine a starting point, before individualising the sentence with a consideration of the relevant 
factors relating to the offender. Guideline judgments exist for a range of serious offences, including 
(but not limited to) aggravated robbery,36 sexual violation,37 grievous bodily harm38 and various 
categories of manslaughter cases.39  
  
30  Geoff Hall and Stephen O'Driscoll "The New Sentencing and Parole Acts" (New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar Paper, 2002) at 17. 
31  Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 
at [3.3.1]. 
32  At [3.3.1].  
33  Ip, above n 20.  
34  Law Commission, above n 21, at [32]. 
35  At [37]. 
36  R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA). 
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These Court of Appeal decisions have a number of benefits for the application of judicial 
discretion. They offer the sentencing judge a single source to refer to as a point of reference, saving 
them from having to consult "the typical scattered and unrelated source[s] of guidance" that exist in 
the form of precedent.40 Indeed, in 2003 the Chief Justice and Chief District Court Judge issued a 
Practice Note requiring counsel to cite Court of Appeal guideline decisions in their sentencing 
memoranda where one was available.41 Assuming there is a guideline decision on point, "references 
to other decisions will not be of assistance".42 Furthermore, guideline judgments give an indication 
of how the Court of Appeal might rule should the sentence be appealed, but at the same time leaves 
the trial judge with sufficient scope to tailor a sentence suitable for the individual circumstances of 
the case being heard.43  
Although guideline judgments are intended to achieve consistency, Miller J has noted that they 
still need to be flexible enough "not to circumscribe the discretion of the sentencing judge".44 This 
is why guideline judgments act only as a starting point. Once the starting point is established, the 
judge can adjust the sentence depending on the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors of the 
offender.45 Justice O'Regan in R v Taueki went to significant lengths to emphasise this point, 
highlighting the need to avoid a "rigid or mathematical approach".46 Ip characterises this as a 
judicial fear of the "pendulum swinging from judicial discretion to judicial inflexibility",47 but states 
that guideline judgments strike a balance between consistency and individualised justice.48 
Despite these advantages, guideline judgments suffer from several major flaws. The first is that 
such judgments only exist for the most serious offences on the criminal calendar, with the appellate 
courts providing no guidance on the use of discretion for the mass of less culpable offences dealt 
  
37  R v AM [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750. 
38  R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA). 
39  For example, Kepu v R [2011] NZCA 104 discusses single punch manslaughter.  
40  Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)].  
41  Sentencing Practice Note 2003 [2003] 2 NZLR 575. 
42  At [2.2(h)].  
43  Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)].  
44  R v Patea-Glendinning [2006] DCR 505 at [58]; see also R v Mako, above n 36, at [60]. 
45  R v Mako, above n 36, at [62]. 
46  R v Taueki, above n 38, at [16]. 
47  Ip, above n 20, at 399. 
48  At 399. 
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with daily in the lower courts.49 They almost exclusively deal with offences that warrant a term of 
imprisonment and as a result, "guidance as to the custody threshold or the use of community-based 
sentences is very limited".50 This is of particular concern given that inconsistency is more likely to 
occur at those lower levels of offending. It means that the Court of Appeal is unable to "give 
coherence to sentencing as a whole",51 because if the Court wishes to issue a guideline on a 
particular offence, it must wait until an appropriate case is appealed up through the court hierarchy. 
There is also a distinct problem in that guideline judgments lack the input and expertise of the 
District Court judiciary, who are responsible for the vast bulk of sentencing in New Zealand.52  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal is inherently ill-placed to undertake the sort of systematic 
research required to guide meaningful sentencing policy. It does not have the resources or time to 
undertake substantive empirical research, nor can it investigate the wider impact of sentencing 
policy in the same way the legislature can.53 As Dr Warren Young notes, because sentencing 
severity levels are determined by the courts without any consideration of financial costs and 
benefits, punishment becomes the only item on the Government's agenda that is a "free good" – or 
in other words, it does not have to compete for funding in the same way other elements of the 
criminal justice system do (for example, policing).54 This, according to the Law Commission, is an 
untenable position. The Commission dismissed the argument that it is improper for fiscal 
considerations to constrain the imposition of an appropriate punishment, asserting that such a theory 
assumed that there is in fact a "right" punishment in any given case to start with.55 "In reality", the 
Law Commission says, "punishment levels are a matter of values, and costs are one of the relevant 
factors informing those values".56  
Public debate should inform these values – their interpretation should not be left to the whim of 
the unelected judiciary. This highlights the democratic deficit inherent in guideline judgments. If 
Parliament wishes to alter sentencing levels, it only has recourse to the blunt tool of amending 
maximum penalties in the hope that this will have a trickle-down effect on the ordinary run of 
  
49  Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)]. 
50  Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [SAC6]. 
51  Hall, above n 28, at [1.2.2(c)]. 
52  Law Commission, above n 21, at [39]. 
53  At [39]. 
54  Warren Young "Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: A Proposal to Establish a Sentencing Council" in Arie 
Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (Willan 
Publishing, Devon, 2008) 179 at 184. 
55  Law Commission, above n 21, at [45]. 
56  At [45]. 
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cases.57 This is an inherently unusual impediment on Parliament's supremacy to determine such a 
critical area of what is essentially social policy. Sentencing should (to at least some minimum 
extent) be determined by Parliament as an elected body representing the people, not by judges "who 
must of necessity distance themselves from the political and public debate that swirls around that 
policy".58 
IV EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF DISPARITY IN SENTENCING 
Disparity is inevitable when judges are endowed with discretion. This was acknowledged by the 
architects of the Sentencing Act, with the Justice and Electoral Committee noting that without clear 
sentencing guidelines there is an increased risk of judges handing down different sentences for like 
offenders.59 Judges are only human, and will analyse a case consistent with their personal beliefs 
and experiences. Hall aptly articulates this weakness:60 
Sentencing is not a rational mechanical process; it is a human process and subject to all the frailties of 
the human mind. A wide variety of factors, including the Judge's background, experience, social values, 
moral outlook, penal philosophy and views as to the merits or demerits of a particular penalty influence 
the sentencing decision. 
This has been proven empirically. Writing in 1991, Hall examined a number of studies that 
highlight sentencing discrepancies.61 For example, a report commissioned by the then Department 
of Justice found that there were significant regional differences in custodial sentences for seven of 
the eight offence types analysed, which were "most likely caused by differences in the severity of 
sentencing by judges in different court areas".62 This was corroborated by a 1990 study which 
concluded that "the court at which the charge [is] heard also affects the chance of conviction, the 
probability of imprisonment, and the length of the prison sentence imposed".63 These studies were 
undertaken before the passage of the principles and purposes of sentencing of the Sentencing Act, 
and while guideline judgments in New Zealand were still in their infancy.  
  
57  Young, above n 54, at 182. 
58  Young, above n 54, at 182. 
59  Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2001 (17-3) (select committee report) at 1. 
60  Hall, above n 28, at [2.1]. 
61  Geoff Hall "Reducing Disparity by Judicial Self-Regulation: Sentencing Factors and Guideline Judgments" 
(1991) 14 NZULR 208.  
62  P Spier An Examination of Regional Differences in the Use of Custodial Sentences in the District Courts 
(unpublished report, Policy and Research Division Department of Justice, Wellington 1989) at 49. 
63  J Palmer "An Examination of Discretion and Disparity in Judicial Sentencing Behaviour" (LLB(Hons) 
research paper, University of Otago, 1990).  
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However, more recent studies also highlight a disparity in sentencing. Although New Zealand-
based literature in this area is sparse, a 2003 study shows that sentencing judges exercise 
considerable leniency towards women when determining the length of sentences imposed.64 The 
Law Commission itself ordered a report that investigated regional variations in District Court 
sentencing,65 which showed that across the five offence types selected,66 some regions were 
systematically more severe than others. This study was viewed with trepidation by Priestley J, who 
indicated that some degree of discrepancy was inevitable if you properly left the judiciary discretion 
to formulate individualised sentences.67 Indeed, the Law Commission's study was methodologically 
limited and unable to control for other factors that may lead to disparity.  
In 2013, Wayne Goodall and Russil Durrant published an article that analysed the regional 
variations in sentencing for the offence of aggravated drink driving in New Zealand.68 It was found 
that "the circuit in which an offender is sentenced for aggravated drink driving significantly affects 
the likelihood of incarceration", even when controlling for factors such as the seriousness of the 
offence and criminal history.69 They concluded that the existing mechanisms to address sentencing 
variability were flawed,70 and explicitly disproved Priestley J's proposition that individualised 
sentences inherently required disparity, claiming that unjustified discrepancy still occurred even 
when controlling for the core sentencing factors that judges need to weigh up in order to achieve 
individualised justice.71 It is interesting to note that Goodall does not think that individual judges 
should be blamed for this discrepancy. He says that they are simply working within the boundaries 
of the inadequate system as it currently exists – "they are left in a vacuum and they have no choice 
but to form their own rules".72 This is consistent with the problems identified earlier: the 
  
64  Samantha Jeffries, Garth Fletcher and Greg Newbold "Pathways to Sex-Based Differentiation in Criminal 
Court Sentencing" (2006) 41 Criminology 329 at 347. 
65  Law Commission Regional Analysis of Variations in District Court Sentencing (NZLC MP0, 2006); and 
Law Commission, above n 21, at appendix. 
66  Grievous assault; theft; conversion; breach of community work; and driving under the influence.  
67  Justice John Priestley "Chipping Away at the Judicial Arm?" (Harkness Henry Lecture, University of 
Waikato, October 2009) at 33. 
68  Wayne Goodall and Russil Durrant "Regional Variation in Sentencing: The incarceration of aggravated 
drink drivers in the New Zealand District Courts" (2013) 46 Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 422. See also Wayne Goodall "Sentencing Consistency in the District Courts" (PhD Thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2014).  
69  At 441. 
70  At 444. Note that this study was limited to aggravated drink driving, and does not necessarily reflect 
sentencing practice more generally.  
71  At 441. 
72  New Zealand Law Society "Stark Difference in Sentencing Identified" LawTalk (online ed, 11 October 
2013).  
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ineffectiveness of sentencing principles and purposes to guide discretion, and a lack of guideline 
judgments for low-level offending. 
How can New Zealand remedy this grossly unsatisfactory situation? There exists a spectrum 
along which Parliament can circumscribe judicial discretion at greater or lesser levels. The rest of 
this article will examine where on that spectrum the legislature should intervene, or to paraphrase 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, how short a leash "the dragon of arbitrary discretion" should be given.73 
At one end of the spectrum lies mandatory sentences, which would circumscribe discretion entirely; 
at the other, an "intuitive synthesis" approach that gives sentencing judges an almost unfettered 
ability to impose whatever penalty they see fit to achieve justice in the individual case. The 
preferred outcome, not surprisingly, can be found somewhere in the middle.  
V MANDATORY SENTENCES 
The introduction of mandatory sentences would be a simple way for the legislature to achieve 
consistency in sentencing. Strictly speaking, this involves setting a fixed penalty for the commission 
of a criminal offence, effectively removing judicial discretion at the sentencing stage entirely.74 
New Zealand has several incidences of mandatory penalties, including life imprisonment for 
treason,75 and more recently the implementation of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010. 
Known colloquially as the "three strikes law", this Act requires a judge to impose the maximum 
term of imprisonment prescribed for serious violent offending76 if the offender is being sentenced 
for a stage-3 offence (or, in other words, is on their "third strike").77 Variants on the concept of 
mandatory sentencing can also include the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences, from which 
the court can then impose a more harsh sanction depending on the severity of the offending. While 
mandatory sentences have historically enjoyed some popularity, their widespread implementation in 
New Zealand is neither realistic nor desirable.  
A Lack of Individualisation 
The first and most significant flaw of mandatory sentencing is that like offenders will not be 
treated alike. It is a long established principle of the criminal law that all of the circumstances of the 
offence and the offender should be taken into account in order for a judge to tailor a sentence that is 
  
73  Lord Bingham "The Discretion of the Judge" (1990) 5 Denning LJ 27 at 28. 
74  Declan Roche "Mandatory Sentencing" (1999) 138 Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice at 1. 
75  Crimes Act 1961, s 74(1). 
76  Section 86A of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides an exhaustive list of what qualifies as a "serious violent 
offence". 
77  Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D. 
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appropriate in the individual case.78 A rigid system that removes judicial discretion through the use 
of mandatory sentences may technically succeed in its goal of achieving consistency within offence 
categories themselves, but it would come at the expense of individualised justice.  
When the Attorney-General vetted New Zealand's three strikes legislation for compliance with 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, he noted that the regime "may result in gross 
disproportionality in sentencing",79 and on that basis was inconsistent with the right not to be 
subject to disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.80 This is an inevitable problem of all 
mandatory sentences. A wide assortment of conduct can fall within any defined offence, ranging 
from minimally culpable conduct that may result in a discharge,81 right through to conduct that is so 
serious that it warrants a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum prescribed for the offence. 
Where then should Parliament set the quantum of any mandatory sentence? This is a question of 
politics. 
The shape of a criminal justice system will be dependent on the political and social context 
within which it has to operate, with sentencing in particular being described by one former Minister 
of Justice as a "social battleground".82 As a result, the question of quantum cannot be divorced from 
an analysis of the influence penal populism has had in New Zealand. Penal populism has resulted in 
increasingly punitive rhetoric and policies from successive governments, and as identified earlier, 
one of the highest incarceration rates in the Western world. In 1999 New Zealanders voted 
overwhelmingly in favour (91.75 per cent) of a Citizens Initiated Referendum instigated by Norm 
Withers, which asked: "Should there be a reform of our justice system placing greater emphasis on 
the needs of victims, providing restitution, and compensation for them, and imposing minimum 
sentences and hard labour for all serious violent offenders?"83 Despite the leading nature of the 
question and the conflation of several distinct issues, politicians have since used it as a mandate to 
  
78  James Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales "Consistency and Sentencing" (Keynote address to 
Sentencing 2008 Conference, National Judicial College of Australia, Canberra, 8 February 2008). 
79  Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (2009) at [15].  
80  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
81  Sentencing Act 2002, s 108. 
82  Geoffrey Palmer Reform: A Memoir (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 323 
83 "Citizens Initiated Referendum (Appointed Day) Order (No. 2) 1999" (29 July 1999) 1999-ps5466 New 
Zealand Gazette 2073. 
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push for longer sentences,84 even though the recorded crime rate had in fact been decreasing since 
1991, and has continued to decrease through into the 21st century.85 
 
The power and influence wielded by hard-line law and order lobby groups such as the Sensible 
Sentencing Trust (SST) exacerbates the problem of penal populism. Pratt describes politicians as 
"running to catch up with [the SST's] demands",86 and in 2010, Prime Minister John Key gave a 
speech at the SST conference praising the organisation as "courageous advocates for victims of 
crime" who play a "vital role in … promoting a safer New Zealand".87 Such dialogue is a blatant 
attempt by politicians to demonstrate their law and order credentials, and to foster a reputation for 
being "tough on crime". It results in a situation whereby political parties attempt to outbid each 
other with increasingly punitive policies,88 in order to appease a public who grossly overestimates 
the level of offending in society.89 Furthermore, the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral 
system gives significant influence to smaller "fringe" parties, who are able to push through their law 
and order policies in exchange for giving larger political parties the numbers to govern.90 All these 
factors contribute towards a political culture that would almost certainly lead the Government to 
take a hard-line approach when determining the quantum of mandatory sentences. Individualised 
justice would be usurped by punitive uniformity.  
  
84  John Pratt and Maria Clarke "Penal populism in New Zealand" (2005) 7 Punishm Soc 303 at 306. 
85  New Zealand Police "Crime Statistics for calendar year ending 31 December [2000–2013]" 
<www.police.govt.nz>. 
86  Pratt and Clarke, above n 84, at 306. 
87  John Key, Prime Minister of New Zealand "Speech to Sensible Sentencing Trust Conference" (Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington, 25 August 2010). 
88  Palmer, above n 82, at 613. 
89  See Judy Paulin, Wendy Searle and Trish Knaggs Attitudes to Crime and Punishment: A New Zealand Study 
(prepared for the Ministry of Justice, 2003). 
90  John Pratt "Penal Scandal in New Zealand" in Arie Freiberg and Karen Gelb (eds) Penal Populism, 
Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (Willan Publishing, Devon, 2008) 31 at 38. 
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B Reassignment of Discretion to Prosecutors 
The implementation of mandatory sentences would not eliminate discretion, it would merely 
give it to other actors in the criminal justice system, particularly to police and Crown prosecutors. 
By removing the discretion judges enjoy, these agencies would in effect get to decide who goes to 
prison and for what length of time, contingent on what charges they decided to lay.91  
Placing sentencing discretion in the hands of prosecutors causes a number of problems. A 
prosecutor, when deciding what charge is suitable, is not in a position to take into account all the 
relevant circumstances of the offence and the offender in the same way a judge can after the benefit 
of a sentencing hearing. When deciding what charge to lay the prosecutor must take into account 
factors such as the sufficiency of evidence, and this is a very distinct exercise from balancing the 
factors that make up an appropriate sentence. Furthermore, the decision to lay a particular charge 
takes place behind closed doors and lacks transparency. In contrast, the sentencing decisions of 
judges are publically available92 and there is a legislative requirement that judges provide reasons 
for the sentence they have imposed.93 This in turn allows a defendant to appeal their sentence, an 
important safeguard that is enshrined in the Bill of Rights Act,94 whereas a defendant is unable to 
appeal the prosecutor's choice of charge laid. 
There is also clear evidence that prosecutors will soften their approach in light of mandatory 
sentences in order to mitigate against unduly harsh outcomes. In the United States, in the context of 
mandatory minimum sentences, studies have shown that prosecutors are often reluctant to prosecute 
some offences due to the penalty being disproportionate to the gravity of the offending.95 Due to the 
inflexibility of mandatory sentences, they will instead file charges for different, but roughly 
comparable, offences that are not subject to the mandatory sentencing regime.96 As a result, 
inconsistency will shift from the quantum of the sentence to what charge is laid in the first place. 
Distortions in prosecutorial practice would be a real issue in New Zealand, as the Prosecution 
Guidelines issued by the Solicitor-General only require a prosecutor to ensure that the "charges filed 
… adequately reflect the criminality of the defendant's conduct".97 This very broad and subjective 
  
91  Rob White "10 arguments against mandatory sentencing" (2000) 19 Youth Studies Australia 22 at 23. 
92  Roche, above n 74, at 5. 
93  Sentencing Act 2002, s 31. 
94  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(h). 
95  David Bjerk "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing" (2005) 48 Journal of Law and Economics 591 at 594. 
96  Michael Tonry Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) at 147. 
97  Crown Law Office Solicitor-General's Prosecution Guidelines as at 1 July 2013 (Crown Law Office, June 
2013) at [8.1]. 
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discretion provides plenty of scope for prosecutors to engage in the same attempts at mitigation as 
their American counterparts. 
C Statutory Presumptions 
It is clear that the widespread implementation of mandatory sentences would be detrimental to 
the criminal justice system. The pursuit of consistency would come at the expense of fairness and 
proportionality, and would merely give greater discretion to prosecutors. However, another option 
would be for the legislature to create statutory presumptions as to what a sentence should be, with 
the ability of a judge to rebut that presumption and impose a shorter sentence if necessary.  
Such an approach currently exists for the offence of murder, where there is a legal presumption 
requiring a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment unless, given the circumstances of the 
offence and the offender, such a sentence would be "manifestly unjust".98 During the first reading of 
the Bill, the Minister of Justice said that the inclusion of a rebuttable presumption in s 102 would 
reduce the likelihood that a jury, in order to compensate for a lack of flexibility at sentencing, 99 
would return a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder.100 Once the court considers it manifestly 
unjust to impose a life sentence and accordingly rebuts the presumption, the full range of sentencing 
options under the Sentencing Act become available.101 The court will therefore have recourse to any 
sentence it thinks appropriate to fulfil the principles and purposes of sentencing.   
Rebuttable statutory presumptions would go some ways to achieving consistency in sentencing, 
whilst leaving judges with sufficient residual discretion to impose a lesser sentence when necessary. 
The key would be establishing a fair threshold at which the presumption can be displaced. In 
relation to murder, the threshold of manifest injustice is incredibly high, with Elias CJ indicating 
that it "is a conclusion likely to be reached in exceptional cases only".102 Distinctions around 
culpability must instead be made when determining what minimum non-parole period to impose. 
This approach does not therefore remedy the underlying problem: impose a high threshold before a 
judge is authorised to depart from the presumption and the sentences imposed will not be able to 
reflect the varying culpability levels; impose a low threshold before departure and the same 
problems around discretion and inconsistency apply.  
  
98  Sentencing Act 2002, s 102. The sentencing regime is different if the murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence 
under s 86E of the Sentencing Act 2002.  
99  The Criminal Justice Act 1985 made life imprisonment for murder mandatory. The sentencing judge had no 
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. 
100 (14 August 2001) 594 NZPD 10910–10911. 
101  R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC) at [52]. 
102  R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA) at [121]. 
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VI "INSTINCTIVE SYNTHESIS" – AN INDIVIDUALISED 
APPROACH TO SENTENCING 
If mandatory sentences sit at one extreme of any spectrum on how to guide judicial discretion, 
then the instinctive synthesis approach surely sits at the other. During the 20th century, senior 
judges around the British Commonwealth began to adopt the view that sentencing was not an area 
that could be regulated by Parliament with mathematical precision or formulae, and that "all … 
well-experienced judges could do was to agree on a range of sentences that could respectably be 
said to fit all the circumstances of the case".103 On this line of thinking, particular rules and 
mechanisms as to how judges should exercise their discretion are unnecessary and unhelpful, 
because there is no inherently "right" sentence to impose. Indeed, Jordan CJ mused that "the only 
golden rule is that there is no golden rule".104  
This liberal and individualist style of sentencing has found extensive support from the senior 
judiciary in both Australia and Canada. The Victorian Supreme Court in R v Williscroft first coined 
the notion of an "instinctive synthesis" approach to sentencing in 1975,105 a concept which has been 
cited and refined multiple times since,106 and which now refers to an exercise whereby "all relevant 
considerations are simultaneously unified, balanced and weighed by the sentencing judge".107 To 
this end, a judge does not need to explicitly lay out the reasons behind the sentence he or she arrives 
at, because all that matters is the sentence itself.108 It is the intuitive weight that a sentencing judge 
decides to place on the circumstances of the offence and the offender after the benefit of hearing all 
the evidence which is important – not the process of jumping through formulaic hoops set by the 
legislature. The method can therefore be sharply distinguished from the current tiered approach 
found in New Zealand which involves establishing an appropriate starting point that is then adjusted 
for personal aggravating and mitigating factors. As a result, the instinctive synthesis approach to 
sentencing has been characterised as "more art than science".109 
However, other judges and commentators have viewed this approach with a degree of 
consternation, noting a number of significant flaws. Kirby J of the Australian High Court felt that 
  
103  Grant Hammond "Sentencing: Intuitive Synthesis or Structured Discretion?" [2007] NZ Law Review 211 at 
213. 
104  R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554. 
105  R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 at 300. 
106  See R v Markarian (2005) 228 CLR 357; Hili v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; R v Morton [1986] VR 863. 
107  Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg "Pursuing Consistency in an Individualist Sentencing Framework: If 
You Know Where You're Going, How Do You Know When You've Got There?" (2013) 76 Law and 
Contemp Probs 265 at 268. 
108  Hammond, above n 103, at 214. 
109  Krasnostein and Freiberg, above n 107, at 269. 
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the approach lacked transparency and was a "retrograde step",110 because disclosure around how a 
particular sentence has been formulated and the reasons for that sentence should not be hidden by 
judicial reference to instinct or intuition, "which does little to provide any useful insight or engender 
public confidence in the task of sentencing".111 Kirby J took particular issue with the instinctive 
synthesis approach in the context of legislatively mandated discounts for guilty pleas, saying that 
without explicit judicial reasoning it is not possible to know whether the statutory discount 
provisions have been applied at all, and it becomes impossible for appellate courts to check the 
sentence for consistency with like cases.112 Indeed, consistency itself is not of primary importance 
under the instinctive synthesis approach. In Wong v R, Gleeson CJ noted that although criminal 
sentencing should not be seen as a "multiplicity of unconnected single instances", a certain level of 
inconsistency is acceptable and inevitable.113 Because the approach eschews the use of any 
mechanisms that may guide discretion, Krasnostein and Freiberg go as far as to say the approach 
conceals and normalises disparity. They conclude that because judges do not need to explicitly set 
out the weight they give to certain factors when formulating their "intuitive" decision, it becomes 
virtually impossible to assess whether like offenders are routinely treated in the same way. This in 
turn means that "sentences can be inconsistent within a (potentially vast) margin of error yet 
[remain] legal".114  
A further problem around the instinctive synthesis approach is the underlying need for a clear 
rationale of sentencing. Ashworth says that:115 
It is one thing to agree that judges should be left with discretion, so they may adjust the sentence to fit 
the particular combination of facts in the individual case. It is quite another to suggest that judges should 
be free to choose what rationale of sentencing to adopt in particular cases or types of case. Freedom to 
select from among the various rationales is a freedom to determine policy, not a freedom to respond to 
unusual combinations of facts. 
According to Ashworth, one of the major reasons for sentencing disparity are the different penal 
philosophies amongst judges and magistrates.116 This problem would be magnified exponentially in 
  
110  Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [102] per Kirby J dissenting. 
111  Sally Traynor and Ivan Potas "Sentencing Methodology: Two-tiered or Instinctive Synthesis?" (2002) 
Sentencing Trends and Issues 25 at [4.2]. 
112  Cameron v R (2002) 209 CLR 339 at [70]. 
113  Wong v R, above n 110, at [6]. 
114  Krasnostein and Freiberg, above n 107, at 269. 
115  Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 
at [3.3.1]. 
116  At [3.3.1]. 
 JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 551 
 
 
a situation whereby sentencing judges had unlimited discretion to impose a sentence according to 
their subjective intuition. Intuitions will invariably differ, and can be plagued by bias, ignorance and 
prejudice.117 A single, clearly defined sentencing rationale – such as rehabilitation or retribution – 
would ensure that judges are exercising their discretion in the pursuit of a common goal. However, 
in New Zealand (as in other jurisdictions) the Sentencing Act does not set out any single rationale of 
sentencing. It instead lists eight, equally weighted purposes of sentencing.118 As was identified 
earlier in the article, this is an unsatisfactory mechanism for guiding judicial discretion, because 
sentencing judges are free to choose whatever purpose they like to justify their imposed penalty 
depending on their pre-existing penal preferences. Hammond J has said that:119  
Before a judge can impose an appropriate sentence, that judge must be properly apprised of the purpose 
or purposes to which sentence is directed. And there should be some directions as to how to achieve that 
purpose. In the absence of a body of case law, or such legislation, gross disparities in sentence are 
inevitable. 
If New Zealand were to adopt the intuitive synthesis approach as a means of achieving 
consistency, it would therefore need to amend s 7 of the Sentencing Act by making it clear what the 
primary or overriding purpose of sentencing is.  
There is nothing in the empowering legislation of New Zealand's sentencing regime that restricts 
the adoption of the intuitive synthesis approach,120 subject to the repeal of certain mandatory 
provisions of the Sentencing Act. That said, the country lacks the appetite for such a method. New 
Zealand has to date followed the regulated approach of England, which is in sharp contrast to the 
individualised style found in parts of Australia and Canada. There would need to be some major 
catalyst – possibly in the form of public discontent with the status quo – to overhaul the system in 
such a drastic fashion. However, public sentiment in the field of sentencing generally yearns for the 
twin aims of greater consistency and harsher sentences – both of which are brought about by less 
judicial discretion, not more.121 This in turn will hamper the political appetite to deregulate the 
sentencing sphere in the same way Australia and Canada have.  
The intuitive synthesis approach would lead to greater disparity in sentencing, make it more 
difficult for defendants to appeal their sentence, and would require the legislature to undertake the 
difficult task of settling on a clear purpose of sentencing. Furthermore, there is no discernible 
appetite for its implementation in New Zealand. While it would undoubtedly be popular amongst 
  
117  Mirko Bargaric "Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere" (1999) 21 Syd L Rev 597 at 609. 
118  Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1). 
119  Hammond, above n 103, at 226. 
120  At 220. 
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those judges who view their sentencing discretion as sacrosanct, its only real benefit lies in its 
ability to give judges a wide ability to impose whatever sentence is necessary to achieve justice in a 
particular case. This, however, can be done without removing guidance in the field of sentencing 
entirely. The implementation of a Sentencing Council is an effective compromise between the 
extremes of the instinctive synthesis approach and mandatory sentences, achieving an equilibrium 
which harnesses the benefits of both.  
VII THE NEW ZEALAND SENTENCING COUNCIL 
In February 2006, the Law Commission was asked by the Labour-led Government to examine 
the existing parole and sentencing structures in New Zealand. There were two major catalysts 
behind this project: the disparity of outcome between like offenders due to the highly discretionary 
nature of New Zealand's sentencing and parole arrangements;122 and the immense public 
dissatisfaction with the lack of "truth in sentencing", or in other words, the perception that the 
system was unduly lenient because offenders were only serving a fraction of their sentence before 
being released on parole.123 This latter point was an issue of particular political sensitivity, 
especially given the political traction and media attention being enjoyed by the SST at this time.124 
The significant difference between the head sentence imposed and the actual time served created a 
situation that the President of the Law Commission, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, said bordered on 
deception.125 
On 11 August 2006, the Commission presented their findings to the Government, 
recommending (amongst other things) the establishment of a Sentencing Council with a mandate to 
draft sentencing guidelines.126 On 25 July 2007, by a majority of 70 to 51, the Sentencing Council 
Bill was read a third time in Parliament.127 It received royal assent within the week,128 with a date 
for the Council's implementation in practice to be determined by Order in Council.129 To date, the 
Government has declined to establish the Sentencing Council, and has indicated that it will not be 
  
122  Law Commission, above n 21, at [5] 
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125  "Law Commission looks at doubling parole threshold" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, April 25, 2006). 
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128  Sentencing Council Act 2007. 
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doing so in the future.130 For now, the Sentencing Council Act 2007 sits impotent on the statute 
books. 
The Law Commission's report and its recommendations involved intertwined amendments to 
both the sentencing and parole system. In many respects, it was the changes to parole that were of 
the most practical importance to the Government and interest to the public. These changes required 
an offender to serve two-thirds of their nominal sentence before becoming eligible for parole, up 
from what was universal parole eligibility after just one-third served.131 The recommendations 
would also require the judge to make it clear in open court how much of a sentence would need to 
be served before the offender became eligible for parole.132 That said, this article is interested in 
how the recommendations will affect consistency in sentencing, and as a result, the focus will be 
predominantly on the Sentencing Council and the guidelines it can issue.  
A Sentencing Guidelines 
The Sentencing Council has a mandate to draft sentencing guidelines, the purposes of which 
have been enshrined under s 8 of the Sentencing Council Act 2007 and include the need to promote 
consistency in sentencing practice between different courts and judges. Indeed, consistency was a 
prominent concern of the Law Commission when constructing its report, noting from the outset the 
need to ensure "that there is, at a minimum, a consistent judicial approach and a predictable pattern 
in sentence severity".133  
In order to achieve consistency the Sentencing Council would issue either narrative or numerical 
guidelines for judges to follow. Numerical guidelines would set out the nature and range of 
applicable penalties for an offence, indicating for example a range of appropriate fines or prison 
term length based on the severity of the offending. This is similar to the function of tariff judgments, 
which often set out sentencing bands that propose numeric starting points for judges to begin their 
sentencing analysis.134 While numerical guidelines have the benefit of simplicity, both for the 
comprehension of sentencing judges and the wider public, the Council would need to be careful to 
ensure that they do not become overly rigid, in turn restricting judges' ability to achieve justice in a 
particular case. This is what has occurred in the United States. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
implement a numeric, two-dimensional grid through which a judge must calculate the appropriate 
sentence, with each axis of the grid having regard to offence seriousness and criminal history.  This 
  
130  Parliamentary Counsel Office "PCO table of legislation waiting to be brought into force by Order in Council 
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approach has been criticised at length by academics, lawyers and judges alike, all of whom argue 
that the system is fundamentally unable to take into account the complex array of factors that make 
up sentencing.135  
To ameliorate the risk of numerical guidelines becoming unduly restrictive, the New Zealand 
Sentencing Council would also be able to issue conjunctive narrative guidelines. Narrative 
guidelines offer a textual commentary, and in many respects would be an embellishment of the 
statutory commentary that already exists under the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act.136 
This sort of contextualisation has been considered essential in overseas jurisdictions, and is the 
approach that has been taken in the United Kingdom.137 At the lower end of the spectrum, these 
guidelines are likely to focus on and discuss the factors that are relevant to the custody threshold.138  
Any guidelines issued by the Council would have to work within the existing legislative 
framework.139 This means that the Council would have to adhere to the maximum penalties found 
in legislation, as well as the existing provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002, such as the purposes 
and principles of sentencing. It is not the role of the Council to recommend changes to maximum 
penalties, although theoretically it could tender advice to the Minister on such matters under s 25 of 
the Sentencing Council Act. Such advice would need to fall under the legislatively prescribed ambit 
of advice "on any sentencing or parole issue that relates to the development and use of sentencing 
guidelines".140 
B Implementation of the Guidelines 
The Sentencing Council Act sets out a unique method of giving parliamentary endorsement to 
the recommended guidelines.141 Once the Minister of Justice has been presented with the guidelines 
(as well as the statement of their likely effect on the prison population), he or she must table them in 
Parliament.142 They will then be referred to the appropriate select committee (almost certain to be 
the Law and Order Committee), who have 15 days to table a report.143 From there, if Parliament 
  
135  See Jed Rakoff "Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should be Scrapped" (2013) 26 Fed Sentencing 
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136  Law Commission, above n 21, at [96]. 
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 JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 555 
 
 
determines that the guidelines should not come into force, it has 15 days to disallow them by way of 
a negative resolution on a notice of motion.144 If this is not done then the guidelines would come 
into force 20 working days after the expiry of the specified disallowance period.145 If the guidelines 
are disallowed, they must be sent back to the Council for reconsideration. 
This negative resolution procedure ensures appropriate parliamentary involvement in the 
imposition of guidelines, a mark of democracy that the Law Commission felt was important to 
ensure the guidelines' legitimacy.146 To this end the President of the Law Commission sought input 
from David McGee QC, the Clerk of the House of Representatives.147 McGee broadly agreed with 
the Commission's proposed negative resolution procedure, but suggested some minor changes.148 
His advice was adopted by the Committee, and distinct changes have been made between the 
Criminal Justice Reform Bill and the eventual Sentencing Council Act.  
In the original Bill there was a statutory direction requiring the Sentencing Council to vary 
guidelines that were disallowed by Parliament, as opposed to the Council simply going back and 
reconsidering them.149 Although there were no submissions on this point, the Law Commission later 
felt that the Council ought to retain the prerogative to refuse to alter its guidelines. This would likely 
only occur in rare circumstances, but it is important in maintaining the independent status of the 
Council, especially in light of its extensive judicial involvement.150 Similarly, Parliament does not 
have the power to amend the guidelines that are tabled before it. To do so would be to assume the 
role of the expert body it has already set up. If Parliament is dissatisfied with the guidelines, "the 
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negative resolution procedure allows it to express this by rejection, but not by becoming the 
Sentencing Council itself".151 
C The Council's Role in Managing Penal Resources 
Consistency was not the only purpose of introducing sentencing guidelines. Under s 8(a)(iv), the 
guidelines must also "facilitate the provision of reliable information to enable penal resources to be 
effectively managed", and the broader functions of the Council are to "assess and take account of 
the overall costs and benefits of the guidelines",152 as well as provide a statement on the guidelines' 
likely effect on the prison population.153 As discussed earlier, one of the major flaws with the 
current sentencing system is that the Court of Appeal is ill-equipped to undertake the comprehensive 
empirical research necessary to guide sentencing policy. The Court issues guideline judgments, but 
it is unable to weigh up the relative costs and benefits of its recommended sentencing levels and 
their corresponding impact on the prison population. Punishment, in effect, becomes a "free" good. 
The use of the sentencing guidelines would entirely rectify this situation. Because the 
Sentencing Council would be required to undertake prison population modelling to assess the effect 
of its recommendations, the executive would in turn attain a significantly enhanced control of its 
Corrections budget.154 For the first time the Government (as opposed to the Court of Appeal) would 
be able to determine where sentencing levels should be set, giving it the opportunity to implement 
only those guidelines that are consistent with its broader aims in the law and order sector and with 
reference to budgetary constraints. Not only would this result in better-informed policy, but the 
greater influence of Parliament also ensures that sentencing levels are democratically legitimate.  It 
is worth noting too that in the United Kingdom, resource considerations and cost-effectiveness are 
not explicitly taken into account by the Sentencing Council. However, the Lord Chief Justice and 
the President of the Queen's Bench Division have both indicated that the system "would be 
improved if resource consideration were a more explicit part of the process".155 
Some of the submissions on the Criminal Justice Reform Bill were concerned that the Council 
itself had a vested interest in reducing the imprisonment rate in New Zealand. This was in part due 
to the Bill's explanatory note, which asserted that the purpose of the legislation was to "arrest the 
sharp increase in prison population" and "contribute to a reduction in the imprisonment rate over 
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time".156 One submission reasoned that such an intention is inappropriate because there is the 
possibility that the Council would issue guidelines that increase sentence levels, depending upon the 
composition and inclination of its members.157 This is entirely correct. The Law Commission later 
accepted that the explanatory note was "over-generalised",158 and that in reality the Council's role is 
more nuanced. Although overseas literature indicates that "when legislatures are required to make 
law and order choices in light of their predictable fiscal effects, prison population expansion tends to 
be curbed or muted", in practice the Council is able to produce guidelines that would maintain or 
even increase the number of people incarcerated.159  
D Composition of the Council 
The Council would be comprised of 10 members: one Judge of the Court of Appeal; one Judge 
of the High Court; two District Court Judges; the chairperson of the Parole Board;160 and five lay 
members.161 The Sentencing Council in the United Kingdom has 12 members, but the Director of 
Public Prosecutions has said that this is too big and is difficult to manage.162 According to the Law 
Commission, 10 is the optimum number to guarantee the Council is representative, but also small 
enough to ensure that it is cohesive, efficient and publicly credible.163  
Whether there needed to be a judicial majority on the Council was a key issue, and overseas 
commentators were divided as to the appropriate ratio for such bodies. For example, Michael Tonry 
believed that senior English judges would not cooperate with any issued guidelines unless the 
judiciary had control over the Council, but the United States experience showed that a purely 
judicial body would not create guidelines with "sufficient rigour" to achieve consistency.164 
Consultation with the New Zealand judiciary indicated that a judicial majority would be 
unnecessary, due in part to the significant policy function of the Council, but that its membership 
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Punishment: The Future of Sentencing (Willan Publishing, New York, 2002) 75 at 80.  
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needed to ensure that the guidelines are "tailored to the range of circumstances that confront 
sentencing judges on a daily basis".165 It was decided that four judges plus the chairperson of the 
Parole Board, who by statute is also a judge,166 would ensure that the Council can fully appreciate 
the realities of sentencing in practice, and would instil wider judicial confidence in the system.167  
The input of District Court judges in particular allows the Council to draw on experience from 
those at the forefront of sentencing in New Zealand, rectifying one of the major problems associated 
with tariff judgments as a means of guiding judicial discretion. It is interesting to note that there is 
no restriction on the lower court judge from taking on the role of chairperson, effectively placing 
him or her in a more senior position on the Council to their superior court colleagues.168 However, 
the chairperson would be appointed by the Chief Justice, who has already indicated her preference 
that a senior judge take the role.169 The Criminal Justice Reform Bill originally required the 
chairperson to be one of the non-judicial members, but this was amended by the Justice and 
Electoral Select Committee after consultation with the judiciary, stating that "the appointment of a 
judicial chairperson would encourage judicial confidence in the Council, and would also be more 
likely to help the Council achieve one of its core purposes, consistency in sentencing".170  
The judicial members would be appointed by their respective Head of Bench in consultation 
with the Chief Justice,171 presumably based on expertise or interest in the area.172 The remaining 
members would be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of Parliament,173 
with the Minister of Justice emphasising that their selection "is not an area where partisan 
considerations have any place".174 Whether partisan preferences can be avoided in a political system 
blighted by penal populism is uncertain, with the Law Society expressing concern that the 
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"membership of the Council could become politically contentious".175 However, sch 1(1) of the Act 
sets out the criteria Parliament should consider when recommending an appointment. This includes 
experience in: criminal justice matters, policing, the assessment of risk of reoffending, the effect of 
the criminal justice system on Māori and minority cultures, the promotion of the rights and welfare 
of victims of crime, and public policy.176 In the original version of the Bill these were mandatory 
considerations that had to be taken into account by Parliament, but this was changed after the Select 
Committee felt it was too prescriptive and inhibited the ability of the House to regulate its own 
procedures.177  
During submissions on the Bill, various interest groups claimed that they should have 
mandatory representation on the Council. For example, the Royal Federation of New Zealand 
Justices' Association argued that they should have a representative due to the "heavy involvement of 
Justices of the Peace … at the lower end of the Court structure".178 However, if the Council is to 
remain at a workable size it is simply impractical to ensure that every interested party in the criminal 
justice system has a say. Appointments based on expertise in the area is flexible enough to ensure 
that a broad cross-section of lay people can contribute to the guidelines. Assuming that expressions 
of interest are widely publicised using a range of media, the system as it stands would also ensure 
that there is healthy competition to fill the vacant positions, in turn increasing the calibre of 
expertise on the Council. This was aptly articulated by the Law Commission, who said that "the 
quality of appointees to the Council and the resulting community confidence in them is a more 
important consideration than a desire for 'representativeness'".179 In any event, the Council is 
required to undertake extensive public consultation anyway,180 which is an appropriate mechanism 
to ensure that all interested parties have their views heard. 
Members would hold office for a term of five years,181 which can be extended to a term not 
exceeding seven years.182 If necessary, members of the Council can be removed or suspended. For 
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the judicial members this is done via the same process that is required to remove them from office 
as a Judge.183 The lay members can be removed or suspended by the Governor-General "on address 
from the House of Representatives, for inability to perform the functions of office, neglect of duty, 
or misconduct".184 
E Departure from the Guidelines 
Although the guidelines would exist to achieve greater consistency in sentencing across New 
Zealand, there will always be a risk that a judge may need to depart from the guidelines to achieve 
justice in a particular case. The Law Commission acknowledged this, stating that "the threshold 
beyond which judges passing sentence in individual cases would be permitted to depart from 
sentencing guidelines is clearly integral to their success".185  
The Law Commission recommended a public interest test for departure, which would require a 
sentencing judge to "impose a sentence that is consistent with any sentencing guidelines that are 
relevant in the offender's case, unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests 
of justice to do so".186 This test is now included in s 12 of the Sentencing Amendment Act 2007, but 
has not yet been brought into force through Order in Council. A judge would need to justify their 
reasons for departing from a guideline,187 but it was forecast that departures would occur in no more 
than 20 per cent of cases.188  
The Justice and Electoral Committee did not immediately adopt the Commission's 
recommendation, finding virtue instead in the United Kingdom's formulation of the departure test. 
This merely requires the court to "have regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the offender's 
case",189 which is a much looser form of control over discretion. The Acting Chief Justice gave oral 
evidence to the Committee on this point, noting that judges (perhaps surprisingly) preferred the 
Commission's more stringent approach. This view was echoed by the Chief High Court Judge, but 
who added that so long as the guidelines were flexibly drafted, either formulation would be 
acceptable. The Law Commission was less ambivalent, arguing that "a guideline that is purely 
advisory may not carry sufficient weight to effect a substantial change", particularly given the levels 
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of inconsistency present at the lower levels of criminal sentencing.190 Furthermore, the 
implementation of guidelines that are merely advisory may be a regressive step, because at the 
moment the guideline judgments issued by the Court of Appeal are binding (by convention, despite 
being obiter dicta) on the lower courts. The Commission rightly indicated that replacing this 
position with the United Kingdom's approach "could thus weaken the relative consistency that 
currently exists in sentencing for the most serious offences".191 In other words, if the test for 
departure was too loose, or if the guidelines were only advisory in nature, the practical effect of the 
Sentencing Council may be to inadvertently create further inconsistency in the sentencing sphere. 
F Constitutional Uncertainties 
The Sentencing Council faced vehement criticism from opposition parties during its passage 
through Parliament. The National Party made it clear that it would repeal the legislation should it 
win the pending 2008 general election,192 with its concerns falling under two broad categories: that 
the Council impinged on judicial independence; and that its existence offended the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  
1 Judicial independence 
Underpinning National Party sentiment was the notion that constraining judicial discretion in 
sentencing with guidelines was an affront to judicial independence.193 This was echoed by 
organisations such as the Howard League for Penal Reform, who submitted that the Council 
"represents a departure from the convention of judicial independence … [I]ts deliberations – 
sentencing guidelines – will inevitably curtail judicial discretion".194 
However, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of judicial 
independence. Pankhurst J, writing extrajudicially, posited that:195  
Judges must maintain responsibility for the imposition of sentences in individual cases. In doing so, the 
constitutional independence of the judiciary is of fundamental importance. It provides the best assurance 
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that sentences are not influenced by political or other considerations. But, the sentencing policy, or 
sentencing environment, under which individual sentences are imposed, is another matter. I would argue 
that sentencing policy is a concern of the entire community. 
Judicial independence extends simply to deciding cases "without fear or favour, affection or ill 
will".196 Its importance in constitutional terms lies in the fact that judges need to be able to decide 
cases without interference from the other two branches of government.197 To this end there exists 
constitutional protections around judicial tenure198 and remuneration.199 Judicial independence does 
not mean that it is exclusively for judges to determine the overarching sentencing framework.200 
While historically judges have indeed had a broad and unregulated discretion in the field of 
sentencing,201 parliamentary sovereignty makes it clear that such discretion can be constrained by 
the legislature setting maximum, mandatory or minimum sentences. It therefore follows that 
Parliament also has the power to implement sentencing guidelines of the kind in question, which 
simply further dictate the nature or range of penalties that can be implemented.202 The fact 
Parliament has not done so before this "is a matter of preference rather than constitutional 
principle".203 It is interesting to note that judges themselves do not view the Council as infringing 
on judicial independence in the way described.204  
2 Separation of powers 
Of perhaps greater concern to the National opposition was the impact the Sentencing Council 
may have on the separation of powers. Christopher Finlayson MP opined that "from time 
immemorial the separation of powers has been seen to be essential to our democracy, and this 
Parliament must zealously safeguard the separation of powers".205 His reservations, prima facie, 
have some legitimacy. 
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It was Mr Finlayson's contention that the Council would have members of the judiciary 
undertaking functions that are more properly the role of the executive. For example, s 8(c) of the 
Sentencing Council Act would have the Council to produce guidelines that "inform members of 
Parliament and policymakers about sentencing and parole practice"; s 8(a)(iv) would have judges 
facilitating the provision of information to enable penal resources to be effectively managed; and s 
9(d) would require them to give statements on the guidelines' likely effect on the prison population. 
These, according to Mr Finlayson, "are not legitimate functions of the judiciary".206 The judiciary 
also expressed concern, with the Chief Justice saying that what is proposed is a significant 
collaboration of the three separate branches of government to produce law, and that this is "right at 
the edge of what is constitutionally appropriate".207 She viewed the Council as having two distinct 
purposes: to promote consistency in sentencing, but also in the "setting of wider social policies 
through sentencing guidelines and the provision to the Executive of estimates about their impact on 
prison population".208 While the judiciary was well placed to assist in the former, the Chief Justice 
indicated that judges had much less to contribute in relation to the latter. 
The judiciary209 recommended that the Bill therefore be modified to assuage concerns around 
the separation of powers. Changes included making it clear that the executive cannot give directions 
to the Council; making it clear that it is still the role of the government, not the Council, to manage 
penal resources; ensuring that the guidelines would indeed act simply as guidance, and would not 
dictate the outcome in a particular case; and to provide for a senior judge to chair the Council, who 
can ensure that judges are not co-opted into policy making beyond that which is consistent with the 
judicial function.210 All of these recommendations have since been adopted and are present, either 
implicitly or explicitly, in the Sentencing Council Act 2007. 
Any lingering concerns that the Council would require its judicial members to be engaged in 
social policy functions that are more properly the role of the executive have been addressed by Dr 
Warren Young, who headed the project at the Law Commission. He claims that judges have always 
had a role in developing social policy through the common law, and that the existence of the 
Council "merely makes the role of judges in developing social policy more transparent".211 
Furthermore, the contention that the Council will force judges to tackle fiscal issues is overstated, as 
their role is one step removed from actually implementing fiscal policy. The Council's consideration 
of prison populations and fiscal policy merely accompany the proposed guidelines, and aim to 
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ensure that public debate around their implementation can be fully informed. The decision over 
whether or not to approve the guidelines is ultimately one for Parliament,212 and there is no 
suggestion that the development of guidelines would have to conform to prison population or 
budgetary constraints determined by the Government.213 
The Attorney-General also received advice from the Crown Law Office which concluded that a 
Sentencing Council would not be an affront to the separation of powers.214 Weight was placed on 
overseas jurisprudence,215 particularly the United States Supreme Court decision in Mistretta v 
United States,216 where the Court held that the guidelines issued by the federal Sentencing 
Commission were not unconstitutional and that the Commission did not breach the principle of 
separation of powers. Justice Blackmun, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said that:217 
Congress' decision to create an independent rulemaking body to promulgate sentencing guidelines and to 
locate the body within the Judicial Branch is not unconstitutional unless Congress has vested in the 
Commission powers that are more appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the 
integrity of the Judiciary. 
The Court went on to hold that the integrity of the judiciary was not undermined, nor were the 
Commission's functions more appropriately that of another branch of government. Like the United 
States, the functions of the New Zealand Sentencing Council have an executive "tinge", because 
they involve the "provision of policy advice, informing Members of Parliament and policy makers, 
and informing and educating the public".218 Whilst skirting close to the margins of the separation of 
powers, the Council is not unconstitutional as it remains an independent statutory body, and allows 
the judicial members to withdraw from participation in any of the Council's functions if they 
consider them to be incompatible with their judicial office.219 
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3 Should the guidelines have retrospective effect? 
It is a long held principle of the criminal law that where a penalty has been increased between 
the commission of an offence and sentencing, the offender is entitled to the lesser of the two 
penalties.220 This is underpinned by various other fundamental tenets of the criminal law: the 
principles of strict construction, minimum criminalisation, maximum certainty and even the rule of 
law itself.221 The New Zealand judiciary has strived to uphold this principle of non-retrospectivity. 
The Court of Appeal has held that it is "at the forefront of a criminal justice system which is fair and 
just",222 and Williams J in the High Court said that non-compliance with the principle is "repugnant 
to justice".223 The legislature has enshrined the principle in both the Sentencing Act 2002224 and the 
Bill of Rights Act,225 the provisions of which are identical and guarantee the offender "the right, if 
convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the commission of 
the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty". This is consistent with New 
Zealand's international obligations, particularly under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.226 Parliament has given primacy to this principle by legislating that it applies 
despite any other enactment or rule of law.227 
However, the Law Commission recommended, and Parliament subsequently agreed, that the 
guidelines of the Sentencing Council be given retrospective effect.228 The Sentencing Amendment 
Act 2007 would require the sentencing judge to take into account an applicable guideline "whether 
or not the guideline was in force when the offence was committed".229 This is prima facie a 
contravention of the principle of non-retrospectivity, and means that offenders may be given a more 
punitive sentence under the guidelines than they would have received at the time they committed the 
offence.  
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The matter was considered by the Crown Law Office when tendering advice to the Attorney-
General on the Criminal Justice Reform Bill's consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.230 It 
determined that there was no issue around the retrospective nature of the guidelines, basing their 
conclusion on the Supreme Court decision of Morgan v Superintendent of Rimutaka Prison.231 In 
Morgan, the majority of the Court had held that the protections found under s 25(g) of the Bill of 
Rights Act concerning retrospective penalties only relate to the variation of maximum penalties, and 
not to the individual sentence that might have been imposed on a particular offender. As such, the 
Crown Law Office said that "the retrospective nature of the sentencing and parole guidelines … do 
not breach s 25(g) of the BORA because the provisions do not change the maximum penalty able to 
be imposed for any offence".232  
It is interesting to note that the Chief Justice, in a letter to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee, implored the members "to ensure that no adverse retrospective effect results from the 
adoption of any guidelines".233 The Law Commission, in a supplementary briefing paper to the 
Committee, acknowledged the comments of the Chief Justice, but pointed out that she had dissented 
in the Morgan case, and that her views are therefore inconsistent with the leading New Zealand 
decision on the issue.234 In the same paper, the Commission argued that the principle against the 
retrospective application of the criminal law is only triggered when offenders are prejudiced, and 
that in practice the guidelines would benefit a large number of offenders.235 For those offenders 
who would receive a more severe sentence from the imposition of an issued guideline, the 
Commission emphasised that a sentencing judge can depart from the guidelines as necessary on a 
case by case basis.236  
As a result, retrospectivity has been justified on the basis that in most situations the new 
guidelines will benefit offenders anyway. In those cases where it does not, the sentencing judge has 
discretion to depart from the guideline in the interests of justice. That said, the need for making the 
guidelines retrospective in the first place has not been clearly enunciated, and the constitutionality of 
the Council may be improved by dropping the requirement altogether. 
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4 Hessell v R – Supreme Court attack on the guidelines 
In 2009, the New Zealand Court of Appeal took the opportunity to issue a guideline judgment 
on the appropriate level of discount that sentencing judges should apply for an early guilty plea.237 
Until that point the Court had been reluctant to lay down any specific quantum for a discount,238 a 
situation which Chambers J described as "symptomatic of the courts' general approach to 
sentencing, with judges vested with broad discretions".239 Although there had been a slow shift 
towards more definitive guidelines on the issue since 2005,240 spurred on by s 8(e) of the 
Sentencing Act 2002,241 as well as a relevant guideline issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
in the United Kingdom,242 in practice this had only served to muddy the waters even further. 
Chambers J said that a guideline judgment clarifying the position in New Zealand would have been 
issued earlier, but the Court was expecting the situation to be remedied by the Sentencing Council 
instead. However, as it was apparent that the National-led Government was not going to establish 
the Council in practice, the Court of Appeal resolved to resume their programme of issuing 
guideline judgments.243 
In constructing their judgment, the Court of Appeal placed considerable weight on the draft 
Guilty Pleas Guideline that had been formulated by the Sentencing Establishment Unit at the Law 
Commission as part of the inaugural sentencing guidelines.244 It also looked at the equivalent 
guideline that had been implemented by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in the United Kingdom, 
which Chambers J noted as having the same methodology as the New Zealand draft iteration.245 
The full bench of the Court of Appeal decided that the Law Commission's recommended approach 
(and, by extension, the approach in the United Kingdom) was "most desirable",246 and implemented 
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it accordingly.247 An intricate analysis of the guideline falls outside the scope of this article. It is 
enough to say that the Court of Appeal adopted a sliding scale of discount which turned on when the 
guilty plea was delivered; subsumed remorse as a mitigating factor into the guilty plea discount; and 
held that the strength of the prosecution case was an irrelevant consideration when determining the 
quantum of reduction. 
The decision was subsequently appealed, with the Supreme Court granting leave on the grounds 
of "whether the discount for [the applicant]'s guilty plea was appropriately given in accordance with 
sentencing principles and the Sentencing Act 2002".248 The judgment of McGrath J, on behalf of a 
unanimous bench, was scathing of the Court of Appeal.249 Although it did not attack the Law 
Commission guideline directly, for all intents and purposes an attack on the Court of Appeal's 
judgment was an attack on the validity of the draft guideline itself. McGrath J said that the Court of 
Appeal had "underestimated the complexity of the issue" before them,250 noting that the approach 
adopted "would put pressure on an accused to plead guilty for reasons that are unprincipled", and 
thus created an "unacceptable risk" that innocent persons would plead guilty.251 Indeed, all 
aforementioned aspects of the guideline judgment were criticised and revised by the Supreme Court.  
Mark Shaw says that this is a reflection on the efficacy of the Sentencing Council, and indicates 
that (at least in the Supreme Court's view) the "sentencing councils may produce guidelines that are 
incompatible with basic criminal justice principles".252 This may be unduly strong language, 
especially considering that the draft guideline received significant input from the High Court 
judiciary at the Law Commission's Sentencing Establishment Unit. Nevertheless, it is proof that not 
all of the issued guidelines will be accepted by the judiciary, despite there being judicial input in 
their development. This is a major blow to any future attempts at establishing the Sentencing 
Council in practice, because it may be indicative of a lack of "buy in" from the top levels of the New 
Zealand judiciary – something the Law Commission considered to be essential to the Council's 
success.253 In light of this decision one can infer that the Supreme Court would have no reservations 
about attacking guidelines that it considers to be inconsistent with the Sentencing Act, which was 
the "ultimate difficulty" they had with the Court of Appeal's approach.254 This problem would be 
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exacerbated by the statutory requirement that the guidelines produced by the Council be consistent 
with the Sentencing Act.255 A soft form of judicial strike down of unacceptable guidelines could 
occur, whereby the upper levels of the judiciary interpret the guidelines so narrowly that they lose 
their desired effect. 
It is interesting to note that the affidavit evidence of several Crown Solicitors indicated that the 
Court of Appeal's guideline judgment on guilty pleas was not being evenly applied in the District 
Courts anyway. McGrath J said that in some regions "considerable latitude" was being extended to 
defendants to receive the full discount of 33 per cent, irrespective of where they fell on the Court of 
Appeal's sliding scale, so long as the plea was entered before committal.256 More substantive 
research to establish the veracity of these claims is clearly necessary, but it prima facie indicates that 
the implementation of the draft guideline prepared by the Law Commission would have had little 
effect in achieving consistency, which was overriding purpose of a Sentencing Council in the first 
place. 
5 Fitzgerald v Muldoon – A modern day breach? 
The Sentencing Council Act has been on the statute books for over seven years, but the Council 
itself has yet to be established in practice. It is still awaiting the Executive Council to tender advice 
to the Governor-General, so that the body can be brought into force through Orders in Council.257 
Some commentators believe that this raises "serious constitutional issues",258 as it is possible that 
the Government's failure to make the Act operative is illegal, relying on the authority of Fitzgerald v 
Muldoon.259 At its most basic, the situation may amount to the executive refusing to implement 
laws passed by the legislature. 
In Fitzgerald v Muldoon, the Supreme Court held that the Prime Minister had acted unlawfully 
when he unilaterally abolished the New Zealand Superannuation Scheme established by the 
Superannuation Act 1974. His actions contravened s 1 of the Bill of Rights Act 1688, which says 
that "the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority 
without consent of Parliament, is illegal". Only Parliament has the ability to make or unmake laws, 
and the executive does not have the power to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.260 
  
255  Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 9(1)(a). 
256  Hessell v R, above n 249, at [68]. 
257  Sentencing Council Act 2007, s 2. 
258  Palmer, above n 82, at 614. 
259  Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 (SC). 
260  At 622. 
570 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
Can the current Government's inaction in implementing the Sentencing Council fall under this 
precedent? It is difficult. The precedent can immediately be distinguished on its facts: in Fitzgerald 
v Muldoon, the Prime Minister was suspending a law that was already functioning; here, the 
executive is failing to bring an Act into force. Indeed, the legislature has bestowed upon the 
executive a degree of discretion as to when the Sentencing Council will actually be implemented, as 
s 2 of the Act dictates that it is to be brought into force through Orders in Council. This is consistent 
with Standing Orders,261 thus adding a degree of legislative legitimacy. Alec Samuels agrees, 
saying that it is constitutionally acceptable for a statute not to have been brought into force after a 
very long delay, because: 262  
… subject to any express provision to the contrary, the minister has a discretion whether or not to make 
an order but, nonetheless, he is under a duty to keep the situation under review. 
There is no indication that the Government has reviewed the need for a Sentencing Council in 
New Zealand, having issued no statement around the Council's existence since its election campaign 
in 2008. The legislature would not pass legislation simply to have it languish indefinitely in 
abeyance between royal assent and Order in Council. If the Government is not happy with the Act 
and has no intention of implementing it, then it should introduce a Bill to Parliament to repeal it. It 
has not done so. There is therefore an arguable case for saying that the Government has in effect 
suspended the law without proper authority.  
VIII CONCLUSION 
Criminal sentencing is one of the most difficult and complex components of the legal system. 
This was aptly articulated by McArdle J, who said that "trying a case is as easy as falling off a log. 
The difficulty comes in knowing what to do with an accused once they have been found guilty."263 
Underlying this difficulty is a fundamental tension between individualised justice and consistency. 
Judges must be given some degree of discretion to tailor a sentence that is appropriate on the facts 
of the particular case, but at the same time, mechanisms need to exist to ensure that like cases are 
treated alike. Finding the correct equilibrium is of fundamental importance, as it ensures the 
integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 
New Zealand has not yet found this equilibrium. There is a growing body of evidence 
highlighting extensive regional variations in sentences imposed, indicating that appellate guideline 
judgments, and the principles and purposes of sentencing, are insufficient to ensure consistency. The 
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"dragon of arbitrary discretion" clearly needs a shorter leash.264 This would not be achieved by the 
intuitive synthesis approach to sentencing, which amounts to removing the leash entirely. Although 
this is the method used in some jurisdictions in Australia and Canada, it should not be followed in 
New Zealand as it removes much of the transparency in sentencing and in many ways normalises 
disparity. The approach also requires the existence of an overriding purpose of sentencing, or at 
least a clearly defined hierarchy thereof, of which New Zealand has neither. An alternative 
mechanism would be to introduce mandatory sentences, which would swiftly slay the dragon. 
Mandatory sentences may technically achieve consistency, but they come at the cost of 
individualised justice. The result would be for dissimilar cases to be treated alike, which is no better 
than the original problem that required fixing. Such an approach would also merely transfer 
discretion from judges to police and prosecutors, effectively giving less accountable bodies a greater 
role in the imposition of sentences. Furthermore, research in the United States suggests that 
prosecutors will lay less severe charges in order to mitigate against what could otherwise be an 
incredibly punitive system. 
It is clear then that the solution to the problem of inconsistent sentencing does not lie at the 
extremities. Indeed, the answer has been in plain sight since 2007, when the Sentencing Council Act 
was passed. The implementation of a Sentencing Council with a mandate to draft guidelines is the 
best way forward for New Zealand's criminal justice system. The expertise and resources of the 
Council would ensure that coherence could be given to sentencing as a whole, leaving behind the 
piecemeal approach that currently exists in the form of appellate guideline judgments. Furthermore, 
the Council can fully cost all of its recommendations and forecast their likely effect on the prison 
population, which would in turn give the Government increased control over the Corrections budget. 
While there is a presumption that the guidelines would be followed, the proposed public interest test 
for departure would ensure that there is flexibility for sentencing judges to depart from the 
guidelines as necessary – finally achieving the desired equilibrium between individualised justice 
and consistency.  
That said, the fate of the Sentencing Council looks dire. With the re-election of the centre-right 
National Party in 2014, the Act is likely to continue to wallow on the statute books or find itself 
repealed entirely. Repeal would be a bold move, as sentencing councils are becoming the norm in a 
range of comparable overseas jurisdictions. Furthermore, significant consultation went into the Act's 
creation, receiving support from both the Law Commission and members of the wider judiciary. If 
the Sentencing Council Act is not implemented then careful consideration must be given by the 
Government around what to replace it with, because the sentencing regime in New Zealand as it 
stands is unsatisfactory. A justice system that fails to ensure fairness and consistency will not long 
be worthy of the name. 
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